On 19 November 2026, US President Donald Trump, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in Shenzhen, China, for the first trilateral summit of its kind, held on the sidelines of the APEC summit. The three leaders issued a joint peace declaration with four points, including one on nuclear risks, agreeing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Here is what the declaration says, why it has come now and what it does not do.
What the declaration says
The fourth point of the declaration commits the three countries to a dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. A similar line was adopted in 2022 by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, known as the P5. The Indian Express reported that the Shenzhen agreement is a political commitment rather than a binding treaty. It sets no caps or ceilings on warheads, fixes no timeline for disarmament and contains no ratification clauses. The official transcript released by the Kremlin notes that President Trump acknowledged that giving up nuclear weapons is "not an easy thing to do". He also stressed cooperation in preventing nuclear proliferation, including in the case of Iran.
Why the nuclear question is back now
The declaration comes nine months after the last remaining US-Russia arms control treaty lapsed. The 2010 Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, known as New START, expired on 5 February 2026. It was a legally binding limit on US and Russian nuclear forces that came into effect in 2011 and replaced the 1991 START I treaty. It allowed up to 18 short notice inspections a year. Moscow and Washington extended it by five years in 2021, but Russia suspended its participation in 2023 after its war on Ukraine, which began in 2022. The expiry followed other setbacks, including the US withdrawal from a 1972 missile treaty and Russia's 2023 revocation of its ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
What Trump has pushed for
Donald Trump has made nuclear arms reduction a recurring part of his foreign policy agenda. During his first term, from 2017 to 2021, his administration held discussions with Moscow on a possible successor to existing arms control arrangements and sought to bring China into the talks, though Beijing declined. The question returned in his second term. Through 2025, Trump spoke about negotiating a nuclear arms reduction agreement involving the US, Russia and China, arguing that the three countries were spending considerable sums on nuclear weapons. On 5 February 2026, the day New START expired, he called for negotiations towards a "new, improved, and modernized Treaty" rather than an extension of the old one. His administration then indicated it wanted multilateral nuclear arms control discussions involving both Moscow and Beijing. That matters because the existing arms control architecture has been largely bilateral, built around Washington-Moscow agreements. Bringing China in would mean addressing a third nuclear power that has historically resisted joining such talks. According to a 2024 US Department of Defence assessment, China could possess more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.
What the numbers show
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 2026, published on 8 June, the world's nine nuclear-armed states possessed an estimated 12,187 nuclear warheads as of January 2026. Of these, 9,745 were part of military stockpiles available for potential use, while 4,012 were deployed with operational forces. Three points stand out:
- China is expanding its arsenal faster than any other nuclear-armed state. SIPRI estimates its stockpile at 620 warheads, up from 600 in 2025, and points to its expansion of missile silos and development of dual-capable delivery systems. - Russia and the US still hold the overwhelming majority of the world's nuclear weapons, with about 8,100 warheads in their military stockpiles together. Russia has also revised its nuclear doctrine, and its deployment of nuclear-capable systems in Belarus has added another dimension to European security concerns. - The expiry of New START has removed the last treaty-based limits on the strategic arsenals of Washington and Moscow. Without its verification and data exchange mechanisms, both countries face greater uncertainty about each other's capabilities and intentions, and the US could consider expanding its deployed arsenal by placing additional warheads on existing delivery systems.
The numerical gap remains large: SIPRI puts China's military stockpile at 620 warheads, against 3,700 for the US and 4,400 for Russia. Beijing has historically resisted joining arms control negotiations on the grounds that its arsenal is considerably smaller than those of the other two powers.
What happens next
For now, the declaration signals that the three powers accept nuclear risks cannot be addressed in isolation, and it provides a diplomatic opening for talks among the world's three largest nuclear powers. Whether the shared position can become enforceable commitments is another question.
Frequently Asked Questions
What did Trump, Xi and Putin agree in Shenzhen?
They issued a joint peace declaration with four points, including one stating that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and agreed to a dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and preventing weapons proliferation.
Is the Shenzhen declaration a binding treaty?
No. It is a political commitment. It sets no caps or ceilings on warheads, no timeline for disarmament and no ratification clauses.
Why does the declaration matter now?
New START expired on 5 February 2026, removing the last treaty-based limits on US and Russian strategic arsenals. The declaration opens the door to talks that would include China for the first time.
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